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Revolution or Negotiated Regime Change? Structural 
Dynamics in the Process of Democratization. 
The Case of South Korea in the 1980s 
Thomas Kern & Thomas Laux ∗ 
Abstract: »Revolution oder verhandelter Regimewechsel? Strukturelle Dynami-
ken im Demokratisierungsprozess. Der Fall Südkoreas in den 1980er-Jahren«. 
This study examines the interaction between the pro-democratic movement 
and the authoritarian military regime of South Korea in the 1980s. Contempo-
rary democracy research is dominated by two opposing theoretical views: Vol-
untarist approaches tend to conceive the transition from authoritarian rule to 
democracy as a negotiated process. Structural approaches view the transition 
to democracy more or less as an outcome of structural conditions, in particular 
the balance of power between incumbents and challengers of a regime. We 
consider both perspectives not as competing alternatives but rather as ac-
counts of two different structural dynamics: In some stages of the democrati-
zation process, it is more appropriate to interpret the confrontation between 
pro-democratic challengers and power holders as a (structurally determined) 
non-cooperative game. In other situations, both sides may recognize that co-
operation (and negotiation) leads to a better outcome than a pure strategy of 
confrontation. The analysis focusses on the interplay between the two structur-
al dynamics on the empirical case of South Korea in the 1980s. A process trac-
ing analysis highlights three critical junctures in which the democratization 
process shifted from sequences of non-cooperation to sequences of coopera-
tion and back. On this basis, we develop an analytical process model that inte-
grates the two (opposing) theoretical approaches on the temporal dimension. 
Keywords: South Korea, Democratization, Process Tracing, Protest, Social 
Movements, Structural Dynamics, Critique. 
1.  Introduction  
Pro-democratic mass movements voice by definition critique towards authori-
tarian regimes and therewith challenge their politics. The development of pro-
test actions and the impact of such movements in authoritarian states are a 
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topical research subject of the social sciences (Goodwin and Rojas 2015, 795; 
O’Brien 2015; Tilly and Wood 2009). These sometimes revolutionary move-
ments often play a crucial role in transitions to democracy. Tilly (2007, 13) 
even claimed that a country’s “degree of democracy” is largely determined by 
“the extent to which the state behaves in conformity to the expressed demands 
of its citizens”.1 It is an essential feature of pro-democratic movements that 
they seek to expand the degree to which citizens have institutional access to the 
process of political decision-making. More specifically, these movements voice 
claims for more (or better) representation, inclusion, equality, and the rule of 
law (Alexander 2006, 59). Their critique generally results from a discrepancy 
between their democratic ideals and their perception of the shortcomings of the 
current political regime. However, as this connection is not straightforward, the 
emergence of critique and its public performance as protest is usually connect-
ed to a compound process of meaning construction and the formation of collec-
tive identities (Kern 2008, 141-52; Melucci 1995; Polletta and Jasper 2001; 
Snow et al. 1986).2 
The following analysis of the transition to democracy exemplified by South 
Korea in the 1980s is based on the so-called “contentious politics” approach 
(Aminzade et al. 2001; Tarrow 1999; Tilly 2008; Tilly and Tarrow 2007). 
Accordingly, social movements, revolutions, waves of strikes, ethnic or nation-
alist mobilizations, etc. consist of similar processes and mechanisms (Tarrow 
2015, 86; Tilly and Wood 2009, 3). The study of contentious politics analyzes 
the interplay of “movements and institutional politics” (Tarrow 2015, 87) and 
identifies “the ways they combine, in what sequences they recur, and why 
different combinations and sequences starting from different initial conditions, 
produce varying effects on the large scale” (McAdam et al. 2001, 13). In this 
context, our study analyses how protest and critique led to the democratization 
of South Korea in the 1980s (Shin and Chang 2011; Kern 2005, 2009; Shin 
2003; Choi 2000; Park 1996). We aim at identifying the “relational mecha-
nisms” (Tarrow 2015, 87; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001) in the democrati-
zation process. By examining the context of public claim making and critique, 
we are seeking to contribute empirically and theoretically to research on demo-
cratic transitions, in particular the structural dynamics of the democratization 
process as well as to the study on the impact of social movements and their 
critique (Earl 2007, 508; Giugni 1999, XXIV; Kern 2008, 175; Tarrow 2015, 92; 
                                                             
1  According to this definition of democracy, "a regime is democratic to the degree that 
political relations between the state and its citizens feature broad, equal, protected and mu-
tually binding consultations" (Tilly 2007, 13-4). 
2  Thus, protest is defined as a "public action by a non-governmental actor who expresses 
criticism or dissent and articulates a societal or political demand" (Rucht and Neidhardt 
1999, 68). 
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Dosdall and Rom-Jensen [2017] also analyze the impact of critique in this vol-
ume).  
Over the past few decades, the discussion about democratic transitions has 
been dominated by two approaches (Mahoney and Snyder 1999): From an 
(ideal typical) voluntarist perspective “all transitions to democracy are negoti-
ated” (Przeworski 1991, 80; Merkel 1996; Schmitter and O’Donnell 1986). 
Conclusions about different pathways of democratization are usually based on 
the comparative analysis of case studies. They highlight how pro- and anti-
democratic forces realize a negotiated transition (the so-called “elite pact”) to 
democracy. In contrast, structural approaches stress the conditions and “social 
requisites of democracy” (Lipset 1959). They maintain that socioeconomic 
modernization leads to a shift in the balance of power in favor of the lower 
classes in the long run (Boix 2011, 814). In this scenario, particularly the work-
ing class is regarded as a leading force of democratization (Collier and Collier 
1991; Rüschemeyer et al. 1992; Tilly 2007, 162). There are no negotiations and 
no compromises between challengers or critics and power holders. The inter-
play between both camps is considered to be a zero-sum game: While the lower 
classes demand broader access to political power, the upper classes try to keep 
them out. The more the balance of power shifts toward the lower classes, the 
more desperate are the attempts of the ruling classes to defend their privileges. 
Consequently, the transition to democracy often comprises a more or less vio-
lent break with the past (Goodwin and Rojas 2015, 796-803; O’Brien 2015; 
Tilly 1999, 29). 
Although both approaches provide important insights in the process of de-
mocratization, each suffers from a distinct bias: While structural approaches 
largely conceive of the transition to democracy as being determined by class 
power (and interests), voluntarist approaches regard the structural conditions 
only as an external constraint, “which actors may or may not encounter as they 
pursue their goals” (Mahoney and Snyder 1999, 5). Consequently, structural 
approaches are often criticized as “over-socialized” and voluntarist approaches 
as “under-socialized” (Wrong 1961). Against this backdrop, this article seeks to 
reconstruct the two perspectives on the democratization process not as compet-
ing alternatives explaining the same phenomena from different perspectives. 
We rather regard them as models for two different empirical settings: In some 
situations, it is more appropriate to capture the confrontation between challeng-
ers and power holders as a (structurally determined) non-cooperative game 
where both opponents attempt to maximize their own payoffs. There are no 
direct talks or negotiations, just an exchange of blows between two rivaling 
camps. In other situations, both sides may recognize that cooperation (and 
negotiation) leads to a better outcome than a pure strategy of non-cooperation 
and confrontation. Therefore, none of the two approaches is superior. In empir-
ical reality, the dynamics of contention are often determined by actors switch-
ing from cooperation to non-cooperation (and back). Instead of playing both 
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perspectives off against each other, it is possible to connect them on the tem-
poral dimension. This will be illustrated in the following study by applying the 
method of “process-tracing” (Beach and Pedersen 2013) to the democratic 
transition in South Korea.  
In 1987, South Korea underwent successful democratization, which had 
been initiated by a pro-democratic movement and was completed with a nego-
tiated democratic regime change (Kern 2005). Our analysis starts with a theo-
retical discussion about the relationship between “structural dynamics” and 
“social mechanisms” (section 2). After that, we will discuss the concept of 
revolutionary situations (section 3). In section 4, we provide a concise intro-
duction to the basic principles and ideas of the method of process tracing. Sec-
tion 5 offers a detailed historical account of the interplay between power hold-
ers and pro-democratic challengers in South Korea in the 1980s. In section 6, 
we will identify the relevant mechanisms of this process in order to integrate 
the voluntarist and the structural approaches on the temporal dimension. Sec-
tion 7 concludes with a discussion about the relationship between structural 
conditions and the autonomy of individual (and collective) actions in the con-
text of democratization research. 
2.  Structural Dynamics of Cooperation and Non-
Cooperation 
The term “structural dynamics” refers to the fundamental patterns of interaction 
between social actors within a given institutional context (Schimank 2000, 17). 
The theoretical interpretation and empirical reconstruction of social processes 
such as the transition from authoritarian regime to democracy usually depends on 
the identification of underlying structural dynamics (Schimank 2000, 196-205). 
However, there are “open” and “closed” structural dynamics. Open structural 
dynamics comprise all (more or less) accidental circumstances, actions, and 
motivations leading to a specific historical event. In general, we can only re-
narrate the chronological order of their occurrence if we want to understand their 
structural effects (Tarrow 2012). The storming of the Bastille during the French 
Revolution provides an instructive example. It also illustrates how open structural 
dynamics shape the singularity of important historical events (Sewell 1996).  
The case of “closed” structural dynamics is different. A well-known exam-
ple is the arms race during the cold war: Military build-up on one side caused 
military build-up on the other side. The causal chains of this process were not 
running independently side by side until they accidentally met each other at a 
certain point in time. They rather depended on a continual interplay of causal 
effects: Actions on one side were a direct response to actions on the other side. 
As soon as this type of “circular causality” (Schimank 2000, 201) develops, we 
are able to extract the social mechanism behind it. The aim, then, is to discover 
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social mechanisms “as delimited sorts of events that change relations among 
specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of 
situations” (McAdam et al. 2001, 25). In the social sciences, theoretical pro-
gress generally depends on the extent to which the analysis of empirical social 
processes leads to the identification of closed structural dynamics and the ex-
traction of social mechanisms (Mayntz 2004, 252). However, since all social 
phenomena partially consist of open and closed structural dynamics side by 
side, the quality of sociological studies usually relies on both: theoretical mod-
els (from social mechanisms) and “thick” historical accounts (Geertz 1973; 
Sewell 1999). 
According to Scharpf (1997), there are basically two different types of 
“closed” structural dynamics: non-cooperation and cooperation.3 In the case of 
non-cooperative behaviour, actors use their resources in order to influence each 
other. There is no direct communication. Accordingly, the course of interaction 
depends on the distribution of resources between them (Emerson 1962; 
Schimank 2000): (a) In an asymmetric constellation, the dominant actor en-
forces his will without taking the intentions of other actors into consideration. 
Consequently, the structural outcomes of his or her behavior are largely a 
product of his or her interests.4 This fact is not only true for individual, but also 
for collective actors. For example, the developmental policy of the Japanese 
colonial government in Korea (1910-1945) was largely tailored to Japan’s 
economic and military interests. Most Koreans barely managed to survive, and 
they had almost no political or economic resources available to counter Japa-
nese hegemony. (b) The more the asymmetry of power and influence between 
the participants decreases, the more unpredictable are the results of their inter-
action, and the higher is the probability that the structural dynamics of interac-
tion lead to an outcome which has not been intended by the participants. A 
well-known example is the so-called “royal mechanism” (Königsmechanismus) 
which Elias (1976; see also: Mayntz 2004, 251-2) uses to explain the rise of a 
centralized state in France. He shows how, in a situation of relatively blind 
competition between feudal rulers in the late Middle Ages, increasing pressures 
for territorial expansion finally resulted in the concentration of power in a 
single hand.  
In contrast, cooperative games are characterized by actors seeking an 
agreement that complies with the interests of all of them. In this case, the par-
                                                             
3  Scharpf mentions "mutual adjustment" as a third type of structural dynamics. Mutual 
adjustment can "be used as a model for explaining stable social outcomes in the absence of 
explicit coordination by agreement or binding decision" (Scharpf 1997, 109). It is helpful to 
understand and explain all kinds of "collective behaviour" (Coleman 1990) such as conta-
gious beliefs, escape panics, fads and fashions, etc. As these processes are not further rele-
vant for this study, we decided to skip the discussion of "mutual adjustment." 
4  Schimank (2000, 274) stresses that there are also many examples of norms that have been 
unintentionally created by dominant actors. 
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ticipants expect a compromise (as a possible outcome of negotiations) to be 
more beneficial for them than a non-agreement. However, negotiations are 
often faced with a dilemma:  
The successful joint search for better overall solutions requires creativity, ef-
fective communication, and mutual trust, whereas success in distributive bat-
tles depends on the strategic, and even opportunistic, communication, with-
holding of information – and a good deal of distrust against potential 
misinformation. (Scharpf 1997, 124)  
Under these circumstances, the development and the outcome of a cooperative 
game largely depend on the definition of the situation, the preferences, and the 
resources of the actors and their reciprocal moves (Dixit and Nalebuff 1997; 
Przeworski 1991; Scharpf 1997). 
In the field of democratization research, it appears that voluntarist approaches 
describe the transition to democracy as a purely cooperative game. They regard 
the regime change as a contingent process of negotiation between pro- and anti-
democratic forces. Focusing on the cognitions, preferences, and choices of 
political elites, they describe how political opponents come to an agreement 
about a peaceful regime change, the so called “elite pact” (Cadena-Roa 2003; 
Schmitter and O’Donnell 1986, 37). In contrast, structural approaches consider 
the transition to democracy to be a product of a non-cooperative game. The 
major causal determinant of social changes is “the distribution of power and the 
substance of power interests” (Rüschemeyer 1977, 8). No negotiations or pacts 
exist between them. Both opposing camps act unilaterally and use all available 
means to defend or conquer control over the state: “It is power relations that 
most importantly determine whether democracy can emerge, stabilize, and then 
maintain itself even in the face of adverse conditions” (Rüschemeyer et al. 
1992, 5). 
3.  Revolutionary Situations 
The basic setting described by structuralist approaches in the field of democra-
tization research can be regarded as a “revolutionary situation” (Tilly 1978) 
where two distinct collective entities oppose each other within a society. It 
begins when a “government previously under the control of a single, sovereign 
polity becomes the object of effective, competing mutually exclusive claims on 
the part of two or more distinct policies. It ends when a single sovereign polity 
regains control over the government” (Tilly 1978, 191). This situation is char-
acterized by three features: (1) Two competing coalitions asserting sovereignty 
over a territory and its population. (2) Each coalition is supported by a large 
part of the population. (3) The power holders are unwilling or unable to con-
sistently repress the opposing coalition and their critique. 
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What are the conditions for the rise of a revolutionary situation? A compre-
hensive answer to this question would exceed the scope of this article. However, 
the definition of revolutionary situations implies three different factors: (a) all 
factors contributing to the development of opposing interests among social 
elites. In particular, increasing social mobility through socio-economic modern-
ization is often regarded as an important cause for such divisions (Goldstone 
1991; Moore 1969; Tilly 2007, 76). As the participant coalitions often consist 
of groups with particular – and sometimes even opposing – interests, the pro-
cess of coalition formation is critical for the emergence of a revolutionary 
situation. (b) All factors supporting the growth of a broad constituency in the 
population that sympathizes with the challengers and their critique. In this 
context, Goldstone (1998, 140) introduces the concept of “cultural resonance” 
which refers to the framing of problems and solutions by the members of a 
coalition (Snow and Benford 1988, 1992, 2000; Snow et al. 1986). (c) All 
factors contributing to the reduction of the state’s repressive capacities such as 
wars, natural disasters, economic crises, and international pressure. Another 
source of the state’s weakness is the inappropriate or wrong interpretation of 
the current political situation which may cause the power holders to implement 
a counter-productive policy (from their perspective). Excessive repression may 
have ambiguous effects by both fostering the escalation of the situation and 
further delegitimizing the political regime (Celestino and Gleditsch 2013, 390; 
O’Brien 2015, 1223).5 
The classical theory of social movements regards these conditions as part of 
the political opportunity structure (POS) (Eisinger 1973). Tarrow defines the 
POS as “consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of 
the political environment that provide incentives for people to undertake collec-
tive action by affecting their expectations of success and failure” (Tarrow 1994, 
85). In addition, Kurzman (1996, 165) showed that not only the objective oppor-
tunities are relevant for mobilization but also their subjective perception. In 
other words, protest movements do not articulate their critique and choose their 
goals, strategies, and tactics in a social vacuum. They are instead embedded in a 
political context that positively or negatively affects their mobilization efforts: 
The usual story of political opportunity goes basically in one direction – from 
opportunity to action. Political opportunity increases, whether by external or 
internal factors that weaken the state, or by changing social conditions that in-
crease the resources and confidence of popular groups seeking change, or 
some combination of both. This leads some groups to take overt actions chal-
lenging the state; the latter responds with some mix of concessions and repres-
sion, trying to roll back the political opportunity. But the state’s weakness or 
rising popular strength sustain the movement, and taking advantage of in-
creased political opportunities, the movement succeeds. […] As opportunity 
                                                             
5  The cost of repression for the political regime even increases when the protest is nonviolent 
(Celestino and Gleditsch 2013, 390). 
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expands, actions mount; as opportunities contract, action recedes. (Goldstone 
and Tilly 2001, 180) 
However, the rise of critique and protest in revolutionary situations does not 
depend solely on opportunities: Several studies demonstrated that activists 
sometimes ignore the costs of repression (McAdam 1986; Opp 1994). At short 
notice, the number of protests may decline in the wake of repression, but in the 
long run, it might possibly rise because, for example, the cultural resonance of 
the challengers and their critique is high and a growing number of citizens 
perceive the repression of the movement as illegitimate (Goldstone and Tilly 
2001; O’Brien 2015, 1223; Opp and Ruehl 1990). In other words, the deterrent 
effect of repression can be compensated for by rising support from the popula-
tion. Likewise, the effect of repressive measures can also turn out to be too 
weak (Kurzman 1996). This leads to the conclusion that the POS model “over-
looks the pattern of tactical moves and countermoves” (Rasler 1996, 149) be-
tween challengers and power holders. If we conceptualize the classical POS 
model as a single dimension where increased repression reduces opportunity, it 
is inconsistent with the empirical findings. Therefore, Goldstone and Tilly 
stressed that “threat” (i.e., the risks and costs of collective action) is analytical-
ly distinct from “opportunity” (i.e., the chances of success): “The way that 
threat and opportunity combine, rather than shifts in the chances of success or 
the costs of action alone, will shape decisions regarding action” (Goldstone and 
Tilly 2001, 183). However, while opportunity is strongly related to general 
structural and distributional features of the social environment, the risks and 
costs of collective action are substantially under the control of the state: 
The state can increase prospective and current harms by increasing taxes, in-
creasing violence against the population or specific groups, taking away rights 
and property or other such actions. The state can also decrease current and 
prospective harm by making concessions, that is changing its policies to im-
prove conditions for popular and/or elite groups. In addition the state can 
choose to respond to protest action with varying levels of repression. (Gold-
stone and Tilly 2001, 185) 
Consequently, the repertoire of the state mainly consists of two components: 
concessions and repressions (of protest). By choosing a mix of both, the power 
holders exert a strong influence on the outcome of collective contentious ac-
tion. Therefore, most studies stress that revolutionary situations produced by 
expanding opportunities do not necessarily lead to revolutions. We only talk 
about a revolution when a ruling coalition is replaced by its competitors after a 
series of violent confrontations. But this is not always the case. Besides a revo-
lution, at least two alternative outcomes are conceivable: (1) If the power hold-
ers fail to dissolute the challenging coalition with consistent repression, they 
often attempt to divide the opposing camp with concessions so as to regain 
control over the situation (Tilly 1999, 39). If they succeed, the challengers are 
defeated. (2) If it is not possible to divide the challengers, the power holders 
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may initiate direct negotiations to look for a compromise which is acceptable 
for both opponents. In this case, both camps have to give up some of their 
claims. Accordingly, the government’s strategy is an important variable in the 
struggle for democracy. 
Against this background, we can describe the interplay between challengers 
and power holders as a “brinkmanship game” (Schelling 1980) (see Table 1). 
The situation is as follows: The challenging pro-democratic coalition launches 
mass mobilizations and protest in order to overthrow the ruling authoritarian 
regime. In contrast, the power holders try to prevent this with a mix of repres-
sions and concessions. In this constellation, structural dynamics of the transi-
tion to democracy depends on the effectiveness of the countermeasures taken 
by the regime (threat) and the cultural resonance of the challengers (opportuni-
ty). One characteristic of a brinkmanship game is that none of the participants 
knows when the situation gets out of control. The only way to stop an escala-
tion without losing face is to seek for a compromise (Dixit and Nalebuff 1997, 
209-10). But the two opposing camps will only participate in negotiations if 
they believe that the expected outcome is better than the result of non-
cooperation and unilateral action.  
Table 1:  Possible Outcomes of the Confrontation between Challengers and 
Incumbents 
  REGIME 
  Retreat Threat 
PRO-DEMOCRATIC 
CHALLENGERS 
Retreat 
Field A 
Negotiated Regime Change
(3,3) 
Field B 
Stable Authoritarian 
State 
(2,4) 
Threat 
Field C 
Revolution6 
(4,2) 
Field D 
State Collapse7 
(1,1) 
Source: Own elaboration (strategies: 4 = best, 3 = second best, 2 = third best, 1 = worst). 
 
Four analytically distinct paths of confrontation are thus conceivable: Accord-
ing to the structuralist approach, the outcome of the confrontation is completely 
determined by the distribution of power between both camps. They both refuse 
to cooperate until either the challengers overthrow the regime by means of a 
                                                             
6  As mentioned above, a revolutionary outcome is defined as "the displacement of one set of 
members of the policy by another set" (Tilly 1978, 193).  
7  In this case, the state loses its monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force. This often 
includes a loss of social stability and a high level of violence. 
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revolution (Table 1, field C) or they fail and the state of repression prevails 
(Table 1, field B). In the case of a revolution, the regime is not capable of stop-
ping the protestors. Conversely, the risk of suffocating the protest movement 
increases to the degree that the protestors move to the brink of a full-scale 
violent crack-down. For example, the regime could declare martial law and 
arrest or even kill all dissidents. Hence, both camps play a dangerous game 
with the risk of great losses for both opponents. In the worst-case scenario, the 
confrontation leads to a state collapse and long term civil war with unknown 
outcome (Table 1, field D). However, in many cases the participants switch 
from non-cooperation to cooperation to find a negotiated solution (Table 1, 
field A). In this case, the unilateral use of power is strongly restricted. The 
outcome of the negotiations is best described with the voluntarist approach. It 
mainly depends on the cognitions, interests, and strategies of the participating 
actors. If they fail, they move back to the path of non-cooperation.  
Structuralist and voluntarist approaches both suggest that only one of the 
paths is possible. However, there is overwhelming evidence that the transition 
to democracy includes elements from both sides: sequences of popular conten-
tion and sequences of negotiation (Geddes 1999). Instead of understanding the 
relationship between the structuralist and voluntarist approaches as mutually 
exclusive, it appears to be more appropriate to regard them as theoretical gen-
eralizations of two empirical settings with different power relations. In some 
sequences of the transition process, actors may adopt a non-cooperative strate-
gy where both camps pursue a maximization of their payoffs on the basis of 
unilateral action. In other sequences, actors may recognize that negotiations 
could lead to a better outcome than a pure strategy of confrontation. From this 
point of view, the main question is why and how actors switch from non-
cooperation to cooperation (and vice versa). 
4.  Process Tracing 
This study applies the method of process tracing in order to analyze the demo-
cratic transition in South Korea in the 1980s.8 Process tracing is defined “as the 
analysis of evidence on processes, sequences, and conjunctures of events with-
in a case for the purposes of either developing or testing hypothesis about caus-
al mechanisms that might causally explain the case” (Bennett and Checkel 
2015, 7). We have chosen process tracing as a method because it allows us to 
study causal inferences on the basis of the reconstruction of a single case 
(Beach and Pedersen 2013, 77; Goertz and Mahoney 2012, 10). In the 1980s, 
                                                             
8  Pruisken (2017, in this volume) also applies process tracing for studying the interplay of 
critique and social change. 
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South Korea underwent a successful transition to democracy. However this 
process never followed a linear pattern (as, for example, classical moderniza-
tion theory would imply). On the one hand, the structural dynamics of the 
confrontation between pro-democratic challengers and the power holders of the 
authoritarian regime were shaped by several changeovers between cooperation 
and non-cooperation. This makes South Korea an illustrative example for the 
analysis of the social mechanisms (in terms of “closed” structural dynamics) 
having led to a negotiated democratic regime change (Beach and Pedersen 
2013, 154).9 On the other hand, we are also interested in the more “open” struc-
tural dynamics of the democratization process. We see the turning points be-
tween the different stages of cooperation and non-cooperation as “critical junc-
tures” in the sense of Collier and Collier (1991) who defined them as “periods 
of significant change, which typically occur in distinct ways in different coun-
tries (or other units of analysis), and which are hypothesized to produce distinct 
legacies” (Collier and Collier 1991, 29). Despite their distinct (historical) sin-
gularity, critical junctures are indispensable for a full explanatory account 
because they often change the course and link the different stages of relatively 
“closed” structural dynamics in the causal chain of events that led to the demo-
cratic transition in South Korea in 1987. 
As a method, process tracing belongs to the “qualitative” paradigm in social 
sciences (Goertz and Mahoney 2012, 1), which is generally more interested in 
the “causes-of-effects” than in the “effects-of-causes” (Goertz and Mahoney 
2012, 42; Mahoney and Goertz 2006, 229). The term “causes-of-effects” de-
scribes a research perspective that is primarily aimed at explaining the specific 
outcome of one or more (historical) constellations of necessary and/or suffi-
cient conditions (Goertz and Mahoney 2012, 42).10 Usually, an in-depth de-
scription and substantial case knowledge are necessary prerequisites for con-
ducting a process tracing analysis (Collier 2011, 824). Based on such an in-
depth case study, one may both explain the outcome of a single case and draw 
more general inferences about causal mechanisms. Hence, process tracing has 
been characterized as a form of “deterministic theorization” (Beach and Peder-
sen 2013, 13; Collier 2011, 823). 
The purpose of studying causal mechanisms distinguishes process tracing 
from a case study that aims at simply explaining a single case in detail (cp. 
Hering and Schmidt 2014, 530). Beach and Pedersen (2013, 9-22) distinguish 
                                                             
9  As explained in section 2, we follow McAdam at al. (2001, 25) in their definition of social 
mechanisms. Furthermore, we agree with Goertz and Mahoney's (2012, 100) definition of 
causality as "a generative process in which a cause yields an effect by triggering the opera-
tion of certain mechanisms and processes." 
10  In contrast to "causes-of-effects"-approaches, the "effects of causes"-approaches seek to 
analyze "the average effects of particular variables within population or samples" (Goertz 
and Mahoney 2012, 41, emphasis in original). "Effects-of-causes"-approaches are typical of 
quantitative methods.  
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three variants of process tracing: (1) “Theory-testing process-tracing” draws on 
existing theoretical knowledge to test empirically whether a certain mechanism 
can be observed (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 14). (2) “Explaining-outcome 
process-tracing” aims solely at explaining a specific case with its outcome 
(Beach and Pedersen 2013, 18). (3) “Theory-building process-tracing” attempts 
to discover a social mechanism between two “observable manifestations” in the 
case. Basically, this variant seeks to “build a hypothesized theory” which out-
reaches the observed case (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 16).   
In the following sections, we are mainly using the variant of theory-building 
process tracing by drawing on the theoretical models and assumptions which 
we presented in sections 2 and 3.11 By focusing on the interaction between 
stages of non-cooperation and stages of cooperation, we intend to expand the 
explanatory power of existing structuralist and voluntarist theories that, each on 
its own account, provide only a limited perspective on the process of democra-
tization. The next section gives an account of the relevant events and steps that 
caused the successful transition to democracy in South Korea. We distinguish 
three sequential episodes between 1980 and 1987. Our case description sup-
plies the empirical material for discovering the “causal mechanism that works 
within a bounded context” (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 61). The focus is on 
changes in power relations and the strategic behavior of pro-democratic chal-
lengers and the incumbents of the authoritarian regime in the context of a revo-
lutionary situation (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 17, 60). 
5.  The Transition to Democracy in South Korea 
This section deals with the transition to democracy in South Korea. In this case, 
the democratization is a consequence of the protest by the pro-democratic 
movement and serves as an example for analyzing the impact of critique. The 
following account is a preliminary step for the analysis of the process of de-
mocratization in section 6.  
In the 1970s and 1980s, the South Korean government repeatedly switched 
from cooperation to non-cooperation, and back. In October 1979, the assassina-
tion of President Park Chung-hee ended a long phase of unilateral action and 
non-cooperation between the military power holders and the pro-democratic 
opposition. After a short period of negotiations and political reforms, a new 
military regime was established under General Chun Doo-hwan in late 
1979/1980. In the following two years, the political opposition had to face 
harsh repression. In 1982, the regime changed its policy and initiated a process 
                                                             
11  Our study also fits with the "explaining-outcome process-tracing" as we provide an expla-
nation of specific aspects of the democratic regime change in South Korea.  
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of reluctant liberalization. Over the next few years, the pro-democratic forces 
re-organized and increased their pressure on the government with protest cam-
paigns demanding political reforms. In spring 1986, the government suddenly 
adopted a strategy of cooperation and offered negotiations to the dissidents. 
Then, in April 1987, the regime attempted to move back to the initial state of 
non-cooperation and repression. This decision caused a major public stir, in-
creased the public resonance of the pro-democratic movement and finally led to 
a democratic regime change by the end of June after weeks of sustained mass 
protest. The following three sections do not only provide a detailed narrative 
account of this process, but also show that the structural dynamic of the transi-
tion to democracy largely corresponded to the logic of a brinkmanship game. 
5.1 First Episode (1980-1986): Repression, Concessions, and Protests 
After the adoption of the so-called Yushin constitution (1972), the authoritarian 
regime of President Park Chung-hee, who had ruled the country since a coup 
d’état in 1961, turned into a highly repressive dictatorship: democratic institu-
tions were abolished, dissidents arrested, and protests suppressed. The Korean 
Secret Service (KCIA) and the police closely monitored almost every step not 
only of the trade unions and the opposition parties, but also of Christian and 
student dissident groups. Although dissident groups succeeded in organizing 
protest actions and demonstrations against the authoritarian regime from time 
to time, the number of protests remained on a comparatively low level. 
After President Park Chung-hee’s assassination by a close associate in Oc-
tober 1979, the political situation of South Korea relaxed for a short time. The 
interim government initiated public discussions about democratic reforms, and 
the so-called “Seoul spring” began. However, leading circles of the Korean 
army disapproved of this development. Behind the scenes, a small group of 
military officers little by little occupied influential positions within the Korean 
security apparatus and delayed the progress of pro-democratic reforms. Over 
time, dissident groups began to respond to this development. In spring 1980, 
the country was flooded with a wave of mass protests (see Figure 1). The dissi-
dents – mostly students and intellectuals – demanded an end of all delaying 
tactics and the lift of the martial law which had been declared immediately 
after the assassination of President Park. At first, the military refrained from 
repressive countermeasures. However, in May 1980 the military cracked down 
and brutally killed hundreds of protestors in the provincial capital of Gwangju. 
After this incident, General Chun Doo-hwan and his associates officially seized 
power and re-established the authoritarian regime. In the following months, 
almost all social institutions and organizations were cleansed. Thousands of 
dissident students, politicians, trade unionists, journalists, and clergymen were 
either arrested or banned from their profession (CISJD 1988). The mass media 
were put under state censorship. Dissident organizations were dissolved and the 
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universities were kept under close surveillance in order to prevent protest ac-
tions right from the start. Under these circumstances, the organization of pro-
test rallies was practically impossible until the end of 1982. The pro-democratic 
movement was almost paralyzed. 
At the beginning of 1983, the new military regime unexpectedly started a 
cautious process of liberalization (Kim 2000, 80-97). We do not know whether 
“fissures in the authoritarian power bloc” (Przeworski 1991, 56) were indeed 
responsible for the sudden change in the government’s strategy. However, 
many studies suggest that a considerable number of regime members attempted 
to compensate for the weak legitimacy of the unpopular government with liber-
al reforms. Step by step, employment bans for dissidents were lifted and politi-
cal prisoners released. In 1984, the government removed the police units from 
the universities which had been deployed by President Park in the 1970s in 
order to prevent student protests. The previously dissolved New Korea Demo-
cratic Party (NDP) was allowed to re-organize and re-emerged as leading op-
position force during the parliamentary election in spring 1985. In the wake of 
this gradual opening of the system, the number of protest groups and activities 
slowly increased (Kim 2000, 83-7). The Council for the Promotion of Democ-
racy (CPD), which included many leading Korean dissidents such as the later 
Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam, was at the centre of this new 
protest network. The popular support for the pro-democratic movement rapidly 
increased and gave the government no chance to turn itself into a “broadened 
dictatorship” (Przeworski 1991, 62). Particularly the student movement became 
a leading force of resistance against the military regime. 
The annual development of protests between 1979 and 1987 (see Figure 1) 
roughly corresponds to the expectations of the above mentioned classical POS 
model (Tarrow 1994; Eisinger 1973). During the “Seoul spring” following the 
assassination of President Park in 1979, dissident groups refrained from pro-
tests at first in order to support the policy of liberalization. A return to dictator-
ship appeared to be impossible. However, as the window of opportunities slow-
ly closed, dissident groups responded to the anti-democratic rollback with 
sustained critique and mass protests. After the military coup d’état in May 
1980, the protest movement was massively suppressed by the new power hold-
ers. The network of the democracy movement was dissolved and dissidents 
were completely excluded from public discourse. In this political climate, pro-
tests were almost impossible until the end of 1982. Along with the liberaliza-
tion of the political system, protest activities dramatically increased from year 
to year (see Figure 1). In June 1987, the pro-democratic movement finally 
succeeded with a campaign of sustained mass protests and forced the military 
regime to participate in negotiations about a democratic regime change. 
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Figure 1:  Number of Protest Events in South Korea (1979-1987)12 
Source: Protest reports in the daily Korea Times, 1979-1987, six editions per week. 
5.2  Second Episode (1986-1987): Negotiations 
This section deals with the sudden and unexpected change from a strategy of 
non-cooperation to a strategy of cooperation by the government in 1986. In the 
early spring of that year, the prodemocratic coalition initiated a subscription 
campaign for a democratic reform of the constitution. The following weeks 
were characterized by a growing confrontation between protestors and police. 
                                                             
12  As mentioned before, protests are defined as a "public action by a non-governmental actor 
who expresses criticism or dissent and articulates a societal or political demand" (Rucht and 
Neidhardt 1999, 68). Protest actions of single individuals (for example: suicides) were also 
included in the sample, because the authoritarian government was extremely sensitive to 
any form of opposition. The collection of protest data focused on the daily Korea Times, 
which is published in English. The Korea Times is a medium with nationwide distribution. It 
was established in 1950 by a Korean newspaper company that also publishes Hankook Ilbo 
in Korean. Although the reports contained therein did not differ significantly from the lead-
ing competitor, the daily Korea Herald, we opted for Korea Times, because this medium 
tended to be more attentive to Korean domestic politics. The effects of political censorship 
were difficult to assess. A comparison of the collected protest data and official police statis-
tics (on an annual basis – other police statistics are not available) shows that the Korea 
Times reported on average about 75 percent fewer protest events than those reported by 
the police between 1979 and 1987. In other words, a considerable number of protest events 
were not included in official statistics. Nevertheless, the relative distribution of protests is 
nearly the same in both sources (Kern 2005, 103-4). Although the data provides no reliable 
information concerning the extent of protest activities in absolute numbers, it does permit 
reliable statements about proportions, correlations, and tendencies. For the purpose of this 
study, this limitation was viewed as acceptable. 
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On April 30, the government finally conceded and agreed to negotiate with the 
oppositional Korea Democratic Party (KDP) about a new democratic constitu-
tion. At this “critical juncture” (Collier and Collier 1991, 29), the structural 
dynamic shifted from unilateral action to negotiation. By doing so, the gov-
ernment appeared to have prevented a further escalation of the situation. 
Why did the regime suddenly change its strategy? The answer is most prob-
ably related to the subscription campaign: Despite strong countermeasures – 
house searches, arrests, torture, house arrests, etc. – the government had not 
succeeded in stopping the process of mobilization. The campaign mobilized not 
only the “usual suspects” such as opposition politicians, students, religious 
dissidents, etc. This time, an increasing number of university professors took 
side with the protestors. Even disciplinary measures could not prevent hun-
dreds of university professors publishing declarations against the government 
and demanding a democratic revision of the constitution.13 By doing so, they 
deployed their high social prestige in favor of the pro-democratic movement 
and moved the confrontation onto a new level. Professors usually exert a great 
influence on public life of the South Korean society. The military regime re-
membered very well that the authoritarian rule of former President Rhee 
Syngman had been terminated after the professors had joined the protests of the 
Korean student movement in 1960.  
Figure 2: Protest Events between January and April (1981-1986) 
 
Source: Reports of the daily Korea Times, 1979-1987, six editions per week. 
 
The power holders must have also been concerned about a comparatively 
strong increase in the number of the protests (see Figure 2). In previous years, 
the peak of the protests was usually reached around the anniversary of the 
demonstrations in the provincial capital of Gwangju (May 1980), which had 
                                                             
13  As a punishment, the professors were later excluded from access to research funds (cf. The 
Korea Times, August 1, 1986). 
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been brutally crushed down by the military regime. Usually, the time before 
May was comparatively quiet. However, in 1986 the protests had increased by 
about 2.5 times between January and April (see Figure 2). The fact that the 
number of protests was usually exceeded many times in May must have been 
perceived as a serious threat to the government. Against this backdrop, it ap-
pears that the Chun administration finally conceded and agreed to negotiate 
with the representatives of the pro-democratic camp in order to mitigate the 
tensions in the run-up to the imminent May protests. 
This measure bought some time for the military government. For the time 
being, the escalation of the protest campaign was stopped. In contrast to the 
expected eruption, the number of May protests remained on a similar level as in 
the previous year.14 In the following months, this pattern continued: From May 
to December 1986, the number of protests increased only moderately by about 
10 percent from 367 (1985) to 402 (1986). Compared with the growth rates of 
previous years, this rise was relatively weak. At the same time, the concessions 
lowered the pace of the protest movement and provided the government with a 
strategic advantage. Compared with formal organizations or small groups, the 
collective bargaining capacity of protest coalitions is generally weak (Scharpf 
1997). By agreeing to negotiations, the protestors had to select their representa-
tives for the negotiations. As the regime approved only members of the parlia-
mentary opposition as negotiating partners, the protestors were faced with a 
dilemma: (a) Leading representatives of the political opposition such as Kim 
Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam were excluded from the negotiations because 
they were still banned from political activities. (b) The protest movement was 
divided in different factions according to their regional identities. Some groups 
even questioned the collective goals of the negotiations. In the following 
months, the government attempted to benefit from these divisions and to deep-
en them.  
This strategy appeared to work. In early May 1986, radical and moderate 
wings of the pro-democratic movement violently clashed in the harbour city of 
Incheon. Students and workers denied access for ordinary members of the 
oppositional NPD to a party convention. The social revolutionary wing of the 
movement was strictly against negotiations with the military regime and de-
manded to continue with the confrontational strategy. The regime regarded the 
unrests in Incheon as a welcome occasion to label the pro-democratic move-
ment as a violent mob and to initiate a wave of arrests against allegedly “radi-
cal” leaders.15 Many dissidents claimed that the unrests in Incheon were inten-
tionally set-up and organized by the police. 
                                                             
14  The Korea Times, all editions in spring 1986. 
15  From May to August 1986, about 169 members of so-called "radical" student organizations 
such as "Minmintu" and "Chamintu" were arrested. 154 students were sued, among them 63 
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After the government had agreed to negotiations, public attention shifted to 
the leaders of the pro-democratic movement – Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-
sam – who were officially excluded from the negotiations. Both demanded the 
release of all political prisoners as a precondition for direct talks. Consultations 
about this issue took several weeks and produced no concrete results. As a 
consequence, the establishment of a negotiating committee about a constitu-
tional reform was postponed to September 30. Right from the start, the military 
regime played for time: The more the negotiations advanced towards the next 
presidential election (in December 1987) and the Seoul 1988 Summer Olym-
pics, the better were the prospects for maintaining the status quo. In the long 
term, the power holders favored a smooth transition from dictatorship to a 
parliamentary system. In contrast, the pro-democratic opposition demanded a 
constitution with a strong President. As both camps held on to their position, 
the talks were deadlocked from the first day. Frequently, the time available for 
discussion was consumed by wrangling over procedural questions. 
The ruling regime mainly resisted against a presidential system because it 
feared that Kim Dae-jung – the popular leader of the pro-democratic coalition – 
might run for office. In order to overcome the deadlock, leaders of the pro-
democratic movement, in particular Catholic cardinal Stephen Kim Su-hwan, 
prompted Kim Dae-jung to abandon his political ambitions if the military re-
gime agreed with the main demands of the movement. Yet the deadlock pre-
vailed. While the negotiators talked, students violently clashed with the police 
in the streets and at the universities. The power holders seized every opportunity 
to crack down on dissident organizations in order to weaken political opposition. 
In November 1986, the pro-democratic coalition began to prepare a mass 
rally in Seoul in order to increase pressure on the government. But the military 
regime remained adamant: Ahead of the demonstration many dissidents were 
detained and both Kims (Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam) were placed 
under house arrest. About 70,000 policemen were mobilized in order to prevent 
the mass rally. Many protestors violently clashed with the police. According to 
newspaper reports, about 2,000 people were arrested. The dissident camp con-
cluded from this incident that the regime was not serious about implementing a 
democratic constitution. They decided to follow the example of the government 
and to use a mixed strategy of negotiation and protest. Representatives of the 
oppositional NDP declared: 
With a belief that the violent regime, discarded by the people, will surely col-
lapse, we now declare that the situation compels us to take on a new course of 
struggling in addition to the dialogue and compromise we have been pursuing 
so far. (The Korea Times, December 2, 1986) 
                                                                                                                                
on charge of violations of the "National Security Law" (NSL) (The Korea Times, August 31, 
1986).  
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All available means inside and outside parliament should be used to realize a 
democratic regime change: 
We believe that a firm solidarity among all democratic forces is indispensable 
to end the military dictatorship. We are resolved to step up an alliance with 
democratic forces outside the party. (The Korea Times, December 2, 1986) 
By the end of year, the protest coalition suffered a further blow. Due to the 
political ban on Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam, the oppositional NDP was 
divided between an “official” leadership without power and the “unofficial” 
leadership of the two Kims who pulled the strings in the background. In De-
cember 1986, the official party leader publicly accepted the implementation of 
a parliamentary system without the consent of the two Kims. In return for 
broad guarantees concerning basic liberties and human rights he gave up the 
demand for a presidential system. The government immediately responded with 
euphoric approval, the pro-democratic coalition with utter rejection and out-
rage. Following a fierce internal power struggle, the NDP was divided. In 
spring, a new reform party was established under the unofficial leadership of 
the two Kims. The negotiations about a democratic reform of the constitution 
continued to be deadlocked. 
As the leaders of the pro-democratic movement were well aware that time 
was on the side of the military regime, they increased their protest activities 
and strengthened the work of the non-parliamentary opposition. In January 
1987, the situation suddenly changed when newspapers reported that a student 
activist of the Seoul National University had been tortured to death by police-
men. This incident caused a stir. The power holders attempted to defuse the 
situation by offering amnesty for all political prisoners and the abolishment of 
the unpopular on-campus military training for male students. At the same time, 
demonstrations and public mourning ceremonies were rigorously banned. The 
government mobilized about 33,000 policemen in order to prevent a mass rally 
in Seoul on February 7. On March 3, about 60,000 policemen were necessary 
to prevent a funeral procession for the brutally murdered student activist. In 
both cases the military regime was successful. Nevertheless, some moderate 
voices from the ruling bloc began to demand further concessions in order to 
overcome the stalemate and to revive the deadlocked negotiations.16 However, 
most other voices still suggested postponing the negotiations after the Seoul 
1988 Summer Olympics. 
                                                             
16  The Korea Times (March 5, 1987). 
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5.3 Third Episode (1987): From Protest to Negotiated Regime 
Change 
The more time went by and the closer the Seoul 1988 Summer Olympics ap-
proached, the more hectically actors attempted to overcome the deadlock. In 
March 1987, the oppositional NDP demanded a meeting between President 
Chun and the two Kims in order to find a trilateral solution. But the govern-
ment rejected this proposal. Even the influential US State Department tried to 
mediate between the two sides. The US probably feared a revolutionary escala-
tion and wished to prevent a second “Gwangju” where hundreds of citizens had 
been brutally killed by soldiers in May 1980. However, as the US proposal for 
a compromise largely corresponded to the ideas and interests of the govern-
ment (the transition to a parliamentary system), the pro-democratic coalition 
responded reluctantly. By April, public discourse increasingly moved toward a 
postponement of the negotiations. In return for the pro-democratic coalition, 
commentators talked about minor democratic reforms. This development cul-
minated at the point where the power holders once again changed their strategy 
and finally moved back from cooperation (or what had been left of it) to unilat-
eral action: On April 13, President Chun Doo-hwan called off the negotiations 
about a constitutional reform and labeled the talks as counter-productive. He 
proposed to continue with the negotiations after the Seoul 1988 Summer 
Olympics. 
President Chun Doo-hwan’s public announcement suggested that he favored 
the hardliner’s position in the ruling bloc. Once more, the interplay of power 
holders and challengers had arrived at a critical juncture: Brinkmanship games 
only work under conditions of uncertainty (see section 3). As long as both 
camps were negotiating about a regime change, the uncertainty of the outcome 
prevented the situation from getting out of control. Each group had reasons to 
believe that a possible compromise would comply at least with some of their 
major demands. Both attempted to get concessions from the other side by ap-
plying small (or larger) doses of repression and protest respectively. They 
vaguely anticipated the point of no return where everything gets out of control 
culminating in a revolution or a massive crackdown on the opposition. By 
following a strategy of controlled escalation both camps attempted to prove the 
credibility of their threat. Each side continually calculated how far it could go. 
Those who gave up first would fail not because of the other side’s strength, but 
because of a lack of courage.17 
By shifting back from cooperation to unilateral action, the regime provoked 
the rise of a large wave of sustained protests which finally culminated in an 
                                                             
17  The point is not: "If you don't obey, you have to face the risk that I will choose this or that 
action." Instead it means: "If you don't obey, you have to face the risk that this or that will 
happen although we will both regret it later" (Dixit and Nalebuff 1997, 205). 
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almost revolutionary regime change. When the power holders announced the 
official end of the negotiations, they abandoned the brinkmanship strategy that 
had helped to paralyze the pro-democratic forces for about one year. Uncertain-
ties were now replaced by certainties and possibilities by reality. As a conse-
quence, the pro-democratic coalition had only two options left: surrender or 
revolution. Perhaps the ruling bloc was subject to the “misperceptions” de-
scribed by Przeworski (1991, 66) as an important element of many regime 
changes. At least, the state agencies had several times succeeded in preventing 
mass rallies of dissident groups. Furthermore, the oppositional NDP was in a 
wearing state of self-destruction. Under these circumstances, the hardliners of 
the military regime had come to believe that they were in a strong position to 
break up negotiations and to possibly resume them after the Seoul 1988 Sum-
mer Olympics.  
However, this calculation did not work out. Although the public announce-
ment of President Chun Doo-hwan frustrated many activists, the pro-
democratic coalition quickly recovered and made an attempt to mobilize the 
masses against the military regime. The risk of a military crackdown on the 
protestors and a possible declaration of martial law strongly depended on the 
attitude of the US government, which commanded large parts of the South 
Korean army. According to press reports, the US State Department had been 
surprised by President Chun’s sudden retreat from the negotiations.18 In May, 
the government responded to the rapid increase of violent demonstrations by 
putting on alert 140,000 policemen all over the country.19 However, the US 
government appealed to President Chun to return to the path of dialogue and 
negotiation. 
When the wave of protests finally peaked in June, US secretary of state 
George Shultz announced that his government opposed the imposition of mar-
tial law.20 In a personal letter, US President Ronald Regan asked his South 
Korean counterpart not to “overreact” and to return to the negotiating table.21 
Although the military regime continued to spread hints and threats about a 
possible imposition of martial law, the decision was finally made. On June 24, 
Kim Dae-jung was released from house arrest after 78 days. On June 26, lead-
ing representatives of the Korean churches demanded President Chun to agree 
to a democratic revision of the constitution.22 Finally, on June 29, Roh Tae-woo 
– former military general and designated follower of President Chun – conced-
ed to all demands of the pro-democratic opposition in an eight-point public 
announcement. After swift negotiations both sides agreed to the introduction of 
                                                             
18  The Korea Times (May 8, 1987). 
19  The Korea Times (May 15, 1987). 
20  Considerable parts of the South Korean army were under US command. 
21  The Korea Times (June 20, 1987). 
22  The Korea Times (June 26, 1987). 
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a presidential system. The new democratic constitution was confirmed by a 
national referendum. In December 1987, the process was finally concluded 
with a free election of the new President. Due to a deep division between the 
two Kims, General Roh Tae-woo won the Presidential election. He had been a 
leading member of the former military regime right from its start in 1980. 
However, he was the last military general in the presidential office. After he 
had finished his term, he was followed by opposition leader Kim Young-sam. 
Since then, the military has never again interfered in the political process. 
6.  Analysis of the Democratization Process 
Section 5 presented an in-depth analysis of the transition to democracy in South 
Korea, which concluded with a negotiated regime change in 1987. By tracing 
this process in detail, our analysis highlighted the causal sequences and events 
that finally led to democratization. In the following paragraphs, we seek to 
identify the most relevant mechanisms of this process and to integrate the vol-
untarist and structural approach of democratization research on the temporal 
dimension. 
Figure 3 provides a summarizing overview of the critical junctures and se-
quences in the democratization process. As outlined in section 2, voluntarist 
approaches in the field of democratization research focus on the logic of coop-
eration, whereas structuralist approaches consider the transition to democracy 
to be a non-cooperative game. As a first approximation, we portrayed the con-
frontation between the pro-democratic movement and the authoritarian regime 
as a brinkmanship game with four possible outcomes (see Table 1). However, 
the brinkmanship game only provides a static model, which is incapable of 
adequately including the temporal dynamics of the process, in particular how 
both camps switched several times between non-cooperation and cooperation. 
The decision whether to negotiate or not depended on perceived structural 
changes in the balance of power between both camps. We reconstructed these 
changes with process tracing. Figure 3 illustrates that the “power relation” 
(Rüschemeyer et al. 1992) and the strategic behavior of the participant actors 
together determined the final outcome of the confrontation. 
The strategy of unilateral action and non-cooperation was pursued by the 
ruling regime as long as it possessed the power to suppress the opposition (see 
Figure 3, I). In this stage, the authoritarian political system remained more or 
less stable. However, during the liberalization process from the beginning of 
1983 to April 1986 (see Figure 3, II), the pro-democratic forces became in-
creasingly stronger and the balance of power slowly shifted in their direction. 
The result was the first critical juncture of the process:  
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Figure 3:  Sequences of the Process of Democratization 
I. 1980 to 1982: Non-Cooperation 
- Military coup and brutal crackdown on protestors in Gwangju in May 1980. 
- Severe repression of the pro-democratic movement. 
- The authoritarian regime was highly stable. 
 
 
II. Beginning of 1983 to April 1986: Non-Cooperation 
- Political liberalization and concessions led to increasing protests. 
- The power balance slowly shifted in favor of the pro-democratic movement. 
- Increasing instability of the authoritarian regime. 
 
 
III. May 1986 to November 1986: Cooperation 
- First critical juncture: The regime offered negotiations about democratic reforms. 
- Due to the negotiations, protests decreased. 
- The power balance now shifted in favor of the government. 
 
 
IV. November 1986 to April 1987: Mix of Cooperation and Non-Cooperation 
- Deadlock of the negotiations. 
- Growing protests as a response to increasing repression. 
 
 
V. April 1987 until June 1987: Non-Cooperation 
- Second critical juncture: termination of the negotiations. 
- No imposition of martial law due to external pressure by the USA. 
- Increasing protests as a response to the retreat of the government from the negotiations. 
 
 
VI. July 1987 until December 1987: Cooperation 
- Third critical juncture: The regime conceded to all demands of the pro-democratic 
movement. 
- Both camps swiftly negotiated a peaceful regime change. 
- First free presidential election on December 16, 1987. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
The regime decided to ease the suppression of the opposition and agreed to 
take up negotiations (see Figure 3, III). The pro-democratic movement agreed 
and also adopted a strategy of cooperation. A major result of this change was a 
considerable decline in the number of protests during the second half of the 
year 1986. Consequently, the power relation shifted again, though this time in 
favor of the authoritarian regime. The ruling establishment subsequently re-
duced its cooperativeness in the negotiations and increased repression (see 
Figure 3, IV). The pro-democratic movement also increased its protest activi-
ties. Both camps pursued a mixed strategy of unilateral action and (controlled) 
escalation in order to improve their position at the negotiation table. In April 
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1987, the second critical juncture occurred, as the regime officially resigned 
from the negotiations (see Figure 3, V). The protest movement responded with 
a massive campaign. As the US-government opposed the imposition of martial 
law, the authoritarian regime was considerably constrained. Hence, the power 
relation shifted again, this time in favor of the pro-democratic movement. As a 
consequence, the regime accepted the conditions of the pro-democratic move-
ment and returned to the negotiation table (see Figure 3, VI). This was the third 
critical juncture. 
Figure 4:  Structural Dynamics and Their Outcomes 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
To summarize the results, Figure 4 illustrates the temporal dynamics of the 
democratization process and the different outcomes of the brinkmanship game 
(see Table 1). It also includes the three critical junctures presented in Figure 3. 
It suggests that stages B and D were characterized by the logic of cooperation, 
whereas the logic of non-cooperation dominates in stages A and C. The changes 
between the two logics were always caused by significant shifts in the per-
ceived power relation between the two camps. As long as the balance of power 
was unequal, one camp (usually the incumbents of the authoritarian regime) 
dominated at the costs of the other camp (usually the pro-democratic move-
ment). The result was a structural dynamic of non-cooperation. The more the 
difference of power between both camps decreased, the more difficult it was in 
particular for the regime to predict (and control) the outcome of the process. In 
this situation, the perceptions, strategies and intentions of individual and collec-
tive actors shifted to the center. The regime had only two opportunities: crack-
ing down on the protest movement by imposing martial law – an approach 
rejected by the United States – or pursuing a path of cooperation. At least in the 
South Korean case, the protest movement was always willing to cooperate. It 
seems reasonable to assume that the final escalation of the protests in June 
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1987 was primarily the result of a misperception by the government that under-
estimated the pro-democratic movement’s power. 
Our reconstruction of the democratization process in South Korea provides 
crucial implications for the relationship between structuralist and voluntarist 
approaches. It mainly suggests that the autonomy of action depends to a great 
extent on (perceived) structural conditions and their dynamics. From this per-
spective, the two leading approaches in the field of democratization research 
appear in a new light: They are linked through (recurring) shifts in the per-
ceived balance of power over time. The greater the differences in the power 
relation and the more confident at least one camp is that it will succeed, the 
more likely it is that the interaction between both camps is shaped by unilateral 
action and non-cooperation. In this case, the explanatory power of structuralist 
approaches is superior. However, if the participant actors conceive of their 
power relation as relatively balanced, the probability increases that they pursue 
a strategy of cooperation and negotiation. In this case, voluntarist approaches 
provide better explanations. 
7.  Conclusion and Outlook 
Pro-democratic movements voice critique towards authoritarian regimes, which 
may serve as a starting point for democratization. By looking at the case of 
South Korea in the 1980s, we were analyzing the structural context in which 
protest and critique did lead to a negotiated regime change. One aim was to 
contribute to the question why the pro-democratic movement succeeded in 
overthrowing the authoritarian regime. The other aim was to analyze the impact 
of protest and critique in the process of a regime change. 
The case of South Korea offers valuable insights into the dynamic interplay 
of conditions and the mechanisms of a negotiated democratic change. We com-
bined voluntarist and structuralist approaches of democratization research on 
the temporal dimension to explain South Korea’s path to democracy (see Fig-
ure 4). This temporal integration of the two approaches offers the possibility to 
capture the changes between the logic of cooperation and the logic of non-
cooperation chosen by the power holders and the challengers. The relevant 
mechanism that explains the changes of the logics is the power relation be-
tween the power holders and the pro-democratic challengers. The contingency 
of the interaction depends on the structural conditions: As long as the balance 
of power is obviously unequal, the outcome of the interaction depends on the 
choices of the power holders. The more the difference of power decreases, the 
higher is then the probability that both sides consider cooperation.  
This result entails some consequences for research on democratization. As 
the structural conditions for a successful transition to democracy continually 
change, the focus of research first needs to start with an analysis of the static 
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aspects of class structures, collective interests, and mobilization resources, and 
then shift the focus of analysis to the dynamic development of the confronta-
tion that may lead to one or more shifts in the balance of power over time. In 
the next step, the interdependent choices and strategies of the participating 
actors have to be taken into account. On this basis, it may be possible to in-
crease our understanding of the social mechanisms in the process of democrati-
zation further (McAdam et al. 2001, 264; Tilly 2000; 2007, 22-23). The result 
also contributes to the sociological analysis of critique and to the study of so-
cial movements’ impact. It highlights that the social and structural context in 
which critique is voiced needs to be captured more thoroughly in order to eval-
uate its contingent impact on social change. 
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